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Mines. Not a single mention in your article, this aspect can be decisive. The ports and beaches the Chinese would need to use in an invasion are known. A dense network of torpedo equipped mines (think CAPTOR, only with shipkillers) would have a decisive effect on an attempted amphibious landing. A network of offshore command controlled mines could deny the Chinese access, and additional fields could be added to deny chokepoints.

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This is an incredibly comprehensive analysis. However, you reference a concept you don’t emphasize enough: cost.

War between meet peers is a slug fest. Who can land the most hits. Who can absorb the most hits.

Cost matters. A lot. The basic unit of war remains the howitzer shell. US cost $3k. Chinese cost $1k. The differential is similar for almost every unit of warfare. Unless the US can compete on cost, it loses. I don’t see the US doing anything to fix its cost structure disadvantage.

Supply chain is also a problem. See my LinkedIn post on this. It will take a decade and cost $3tr to make the IS military independent of Chinese inputs. We can’t wage war on them because they control our military supply chain. I don’t see any effort in DC on that other than chips.

We are…fucked.

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